The relationship between the Active Component of the U.S. Army and the Army National Guard has been troubled and divisive. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, he unwittingly touched off a significant dispute between the active Army and the Army National Guard. Three of the Army National Guard's combat brigades - designed to go to war with active Army combat divisions - were mobilized and trained, but never deployed to the Gulf War. In the aftermath of this public relations debacle, the Congress drafted legislation which mandated that the Army increase its support of the Reserve Components by assigning 5,000 active Army advisors to positions in direct support. In response, the Army created several training organizations, one of which was the Resident Training Detachment. The purpose of this monograph is to explore the genesis, the mission and functions of the Resident Training Detachments and to compare those to the identified pre- and post-mobilization training deficiencies of the Gulf War Roundout Brigades. The research question asks whether the Resident Training Detachments contribute effectively toward solving the Gulf War training deficiencies. The author concludes that the relationship is an effective one.
Training Relationship Between the Army National Guard Brigades and Their Active Army Resident Training Detachments -- Is This an Effective Relationship
1999
58 pages
Report
No indication
English