Operational maneuver warfare achieved major acceptance in the United States military in the 1980's. This new doctrine has not been accepted by our allies or possible coalition partners. There is a potential for confusion and conflict between doctrinal theory, the application of operational maneuver, and politically motivated restrictions, especially in coalition endeavors. This study summarizes the main ideas of ground operational maneuver against a conventional threat. It uses two recent examples showing how coalition and allied restraints limited operational commanders. The United States Army's new doctrine of maneuver warfare seriously concerned NATO and the German Government. Another example was evident in the 1990-91 Gulf War when coalition restraints affected General Schwarzkopf's ability to exercise operational maneuver. As our experience in NATO and the Gulf War demonstrated, we will not fight future wars without regard to the views of our coalition partners. Combined planning and training with allies and future coalition partners during peacetime contributes to an understanding of doctrine and interoperability.
Affects of Coalition Political Restrictions on Operational Maneuver
1997
23 pages
Report
No indication
English
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