Both U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy service doctrines take a parochial and dogmatic approach to joint operations in the maritime environment, with both services claiming their service or associated functional component should earn the title 'supported commander'. However, when measured against the backdrop of maritime conflict with a near-peer adversary conducting high intensity anti-access warfare, both services. beliefs lose legitimacy. This paper argues that to best leverage joint force capabilities against such an adversary, the joint force commander should initially name the JFACC as the supported commander, but with the specific objective of neutralizing the adversary's maritime anti-access capability. With this accomplished, command relationships should shift and the JFMCC should be named supported commander, with the objective of seeking a decisive engagement against the adversary's maritime forces to achieve the joint force commander's campaign objectives. Based on this conclusion, this paper recommends future courses of action for both the Navy and the Air Force to make the operational situation more tenable, and concludes with recommendations to joint force commanders to manage shifts in command relationships.
Supported Commander in High Intensity Anti-Access Maritime Conflict
2009
25 pages
Report
No indication
English
Management Practice , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Air power , Military commanders , Military doctrine , Naval operations , Joint military activities , Ocean environments , High intensity , Threats , Air force , Warfare , Military operations , Navy , Maritime operations , Air operations
Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
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|Low Intensity Conflict from a Maritime Perspective
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