Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) as a mission area for USN and USCG assets does not seem to be going away anytime soon. The purpose of this essay is to assess past MIO efforts and offer recommendations to assist the operational commander in making MIO more effective. MIO can and will be more successful than it has been in the past decade, if the operational commander integrates a more complete study of the operational factors of space, time, and force in the initial planning phase. Past MIO examples indicate that the full assessment of these three factors have either come too late or were not thorough enough to achieve its full potential. Prior to the initial planning phase, the operational commander should fully develop these three operational factors in order to answer three fundamental questions: (1) Can MIO effectively produce the political objective or desired end state; (2) What other instruments of national power will also be required; (3) How will operational functions need to be tailored or implemented to make the operation more effective; MIO continues to be a popular political military operation other than war to achieve a desired end state or means to attain our political objectives.
Task No Maritime Operational Commander Wants: Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) Are Not Going Away
2003
24 pages
Report
No indication
English
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Naval operations , Military commanders , Drug interdiction , Warfare , Military strategy , Political science , Lessons learned , Threats , Military doctrine , Mission profiles , Interception , Joint military activities , Conflict , Maritime interception operations , Counter-drug operations , Blockades , Maritime interdiction , Maritime law enforcement