This paper presents a matching mechanism for assigning drivers to routes where the drivers pay a toll for the marginal delay they impose on other drivers. The simple matching mechanism is derived from the deterministic algorithm for online bipartite matching proposed in [1]. The toll, which is anticipatory in design, is an adaption of one proposed in [2]. Our research proves that the matching mechanism proposed here is Pareto user-optimal, that is, it is fair to all drivers and achieves a competitive ratio of 1 + log(m), where $m$ is the number of available routes, when applied with a goal of minimizing total network travel cost.
A Matching Mechanism with Anticipatory Tolls for Congestion Pricing
2021-09-19
301158 byte
Conference paper
Electronic Resource
English
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