This paper presents a matching mechanism for assigning drivers to routes where the drivers pay a toll for the marginal delay they impose on other drivers. The simple matching mechanism is derived from the deterministic algorithm for online bipartite matching proposed in [1]. The toll, which is anticipatory in design, is an adaption of one proposed in [2]. Our research proves that the matching mechanism proposed here is Pareto user-optimal, that is, it is fair to all drivers and achieves a competitive ratio of 1 + log(m), where $m$ is the number of available routes, when applied with a goal of minimizing total network travel cost.


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    Titel :

    A Matching Mechanism with Anticipatory Tolls for Congestion Pricing


    Beteiligte:


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2021-09-19


    Format / Umfang :

    301158 byte




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Konferenz)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch



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