Abstract Low onboard spending and insufficient onshore time are the two main problems affecting the earnings of both cruise lines and port cities in the Chinese cruise market. However, increasing port berthing time can benefit port cities at the cost of cruise lines. To balance the two parties, we propose a compensation mechanism based on the cooperative game-theory, where the city subsidizes the cruise ship to stay longer to maximise overall incremental benefits. A questionnaire survey is conducted to collect data on tourists' spending and onshore time in different port cities and their budgets. The feasibility of the mechanism depends on the sailing distance of the cruise ship, the number of connected ports, and the tourists’ average budget. This compensation mechanism can enhance the total benefits of the cruise chain, improve customer satisfaction, and provide a new model for developing the cruise industry in China.
Highlights Low onboard spending and short onshore time are the two main problems in the Chinese cruise market. A mechanism is designed using the cooperative game-theory where the city subsidizes the cruise ship to stay longer. The feasibility of the mechanism depends on the sailing distance of the cruise ship, the number of connected ports, and the tourists’ average budget. Tourists’ marginal spending diminishes over time and best fitted using an exponential function. The mechanism can improve the earnings of cruise line, port cities, and promote the satisfactory of tourists.
Compensation mechanism for port time extension in cruise line designs
Transport Policy ; 139 ; 144-154
2023-06-14
11 pages
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
English
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