JEL: C78; D78 ; A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by only using linear programming. We show that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all equilibrium assignments, and vice versa. We also show that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure and we study how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium. ; Peer reviewed


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    Title :

    The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria


    Contributors:

    Publication date :

    2009-07-26


    Type of media :

    Paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



    Classification :

    DDC:    629