JEL Classification Codes: C78; D78 ; A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium. ; The work of D. Jaume and A. Neme is partially supported by the Universidad Nacional de San Luis through grant 319502 and by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientí cas y Técnicas (CONICET) through grant PICT-02114. Support for the research of J. Massó was received through the prize ICREA Acadèmia for excellence in research, funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya. He also acknowledges the support of MOVE, where he is an a¢ liated researcher, and of the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (through its Research Recognition Programme), where he is an a¢ liated professor. His work is also supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grants ECO2008-04756 (Grupo Consolidado-C) and CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 (CDS2006-00016), and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through grant SGR2009-419. ; Peer reviewed
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sales and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria
2010-03-05
Paper
Electronic Resource
English
DDC: | 629 |
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