In this paper a fishery resource exploitation model in which a single firm or a cartel has leased the rights to manage the resources independently is analysed. Two variables, resource level and the capital level, determine the dynamics of the resource system. The leasing contract includes an incentive for the agent to maintain the resource level high. The main result is that sole-agent resource management and efficiency of the resource use do not necessarily imply that the fishery is stabilized at a unique steady state level. Instead, the optimal resource exploitation may lead to periodic capital investments in fishing vessels and gear which in turn causes cycles in the resource economy. It is shown analytically that nonzero discount rate and low capital depreciation rate both favor the conditions under which periodic optimal solutions may occur. Simulation results related to a Baltic herring fishery are used to illustrate the results.


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    Title :

    Resource leasing and optimal periodic capital investments


    Additional title:

    Ein Modell zur Ressourcennutzung in der Fischerei. Das Mieten von Ressourcen und optimale, periodische Kapitalinvestitionen


    Contributors:
    Novak, A. (author) / Kaitala, V. (author) / Feichtinger, G. (author)

    Published in:

    Publication date :

    1995


    Size :

    21 Seiten, 3 Bilder, 33 Quellen




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Print


    Language :

    English




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