In tomorrow's 'brilliant' weapons, next-generation avionic computers will need to orchestrate the actions of many subsystems while further maintaining the security of sensitive data, the integrity of key data and of system behavior, and often other key properties. Maintenance of these properties will help ensure that system execution is trustable, conforming to both prescribed policies and expected behavior. For traditional security (confidentiality) as required by DoD, the policy to be maintained is well understood and essentially application independent. Although the weapon environment will surely render inadequate much of current security engineering practice and likely stress the security technology base, the now familiar, fundamental mechanisms of MAC and DAC will still form the foundation of suitable multi-level security (MLS) maintenance. For integrity maintenance, however, realistic policies are quite application dependent. In general, a specific integrity policy needs to comprehend not only certain behavioral aspects of the overall application, but also of potentially many distinct states within the application. Thus, integrity maintenance requires control derived from a state machine specifying 'acceptable' application behavior.
Trustable computing in next-generation avionic architectures
Verläßliche Berechnung in Avionikarchitekturen der nächsten Generation
1992
9 Seiten, 12 Bilder, 1 Tabelle, 6 Quellen
Conference paper
English
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