This article analyzes optimal concession contracts offered by a landlord port authority to competing operators of container terminals. The port authority pursues traffic-volume maximization. Three contract schemes considered are fixed-fee, unit-fee, and two-part tariff. A two-stage game is constructed to characterize interactions between the port authority and two terminal operators. We discover that the fixed-fee contract is the best choice for the authority. Terminal operators’ congestion costs and competition modes have no impact on this contract choice. Our results demonstrate that port authority’s goal is an important factor in determining optimal concession contracts.


    Access

    Check access

    Check availability in my library

    Order at Subito €


    Export, share and cite



    Title :

    Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities to maximize traffic volumes


    Contributors:

    Published in:

    Publication date :

    2015-01-02


    Size :

    15 pages




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



    Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities with different pursuing goals

    Han, Wenqing / Chen, Hsiao-Chi / Liu, Shi-Miin | Taylor & Francis Verlag | 2018


    Optimal safety incentives in road concession contracts

    Pablo Perez de Villar / Jose Manuel Vassallo | DOAJ | 2014

    Free access


    Maintenance Incentives in Highway Concession Contracts

    Gonçalves, Ricardo | Online Contents | 2012


    RISK ALLOCATION IN MOTORWAY CONCESSION CONTRACTS IN SPAIN

    Vassallo, J.M. / World Road Association | British Library Conference Proceedings | 2007