This article presents a game-theoretic model of information transmission for variable message sign (VMS) operations. The model contains one VMS operator and many drivers. The operator wants to minimise the total travel time of all the drivers, while each driver wants to minimise his own travel time. The operator, who knows the actual traffic situation, sends drivers’ the traffic information strategically. The drivers evaluate the information from the operator, and then choose their optimal route. We model this situation as a cheap-talk game, which is one of the simplest forms of a Bayesian game. Depending on the shapes of the travel time function, the optimal information provision in equilibrium varies from full provision to partial provision.


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    Title :

    Variable message sign operating strategies: simple examples


    Contributors:

    Published in:

    Transportmetrica ; 7 , 6 ; 443-454


    Publication date :

    2011-11-01




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




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