The competition among a finite number of firms who must transport the fixed volume of traffic over a prescribed planning horizon is considered on a congested transportation network with one origin-destination pair connected by parallel routes. It is assumed that each firm attempts to minimize individual transportation cost by making a sequence of simultaneous decisions of departure time, route, and departure flow rate based on the trade-off between arc traversal time and schedule delay penalty. The model is formulated as anN-person nonzero-sum discrete-time dynamic game. A Cournot-Nash network equilibrium is defined under the open-loop information structure. Optimality conditions are derived using the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and given economic interpretation as a dynamic game theoretic generalization of Wardrop’s second principle which requires equilibration of certain marginal costs. A computational algorithm based on the augmented Lagrangian method and the gradient method is proposed and a numerical example is provided. Future extensions of the model and the algorithm are also discussed.


    Access

    Check access

    Check availability in my library

    Order at Subito €


    Export, share and cite



    Title :

    The computation of dynamic cournot-nash traffic network equilibria in discrete time


    Additional title:

    KSCE J Civ Eng


    Contributors:

    Published in:

    Publication date :

    2000-12-01


    Size :

    10 pages




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




    Distributed computation of dynamic traffic equilibria

    Wisten, M.B. | Online Contents | 1997


    Discrete Time Cournot Model for Electricity Market Simulation

    Estrada-Cruz, O. / Gutierrez-Alcaraz, G. / Tovar-Hernández, J.H. | IEEE | 2008


    Multiple equilibria in a dynamic traffic network

    Iryo, Takamasa | Online Contents | 2011