Abstract The criteria by which travellers choose their routes in a traffic network are, to some degree, in conflict with society’s goal of utilizing the network efficiently: a traveller can be expected to most often choose a route which minimizes a combination of travel time and expenses while society’s goal often is to have low average travel times and little damage to the environment. The traffic system may be viewed as a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, in which a traffic manager, represented as the leader, changes the infrastructure so as to achieve some overall management goal with respect to the distribution of the traffic in the network. The travellers are then modelled as the followers; they react to the infrastructure changes by modifying their behaviour, for example by adjusting their route choices or travel modes. If the manager’s infrastructure changes are adequate, then the travellers’ response is the desired one. Common means for achieving such a change in the traffic flows are to invest in traffic network capacity, to introduce traffic controls such as traffic lights and one-way traffic, to introduce tolls on some links, or some other network design measure, and to supply the travellers with information about alternative routes.
Side Constrained Traffic Equilibrium Models—Traffic Management Through Link Tolls
1998-01-01
27 pages
Article/Chapter (Book)
Electronic Resource
English
7 SIDE CONSTRAINED TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM MODELS - TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT THROUGH LINK TOLLS
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