Emerging plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), as distributed energy sources, are promising to provide vehicle-to-grid (V2G) services for the power grid, like frequency and voltage regulations, by coordinating their active and reactive power rates. However, due to the autonomy of PEVs, it is challenging how to efficiently schedule the coordination behaviors among these units in a distributed way. In this chapter we formulate the underlying coordination problems as a novel class of VCG-style auction games where players, power grid, and PEVs, do not report a full cost or valuation function but only a multi-dimensional bid signal: the maximum active and reactive power quantities that power grid wants and the maximum per unit prices it is willing to pay, the maximum active and reactive power quantities that a PEV can provide and the minimum per unit prices it asks. From this formulation, the underlying V2G problem is actually a two-type resource allocation problem featuring the active and reactive power as resources. We show the existence of an efficient Nash equilibrium (NE) for the underlying auction games, though there may exist other inefficient NEs. In order to deal with large-scale PEVs, we design games with aggregator players each of which submits bid profiles representing the overall utility for a collection of PEVs, and extend the so-called quantized-PSP mechanism to the underlying auction games to implement an efficient NE.


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    Title :

    Efficient Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Coordination in Smart Grid Under Auction Games


    Contributors:
    Ma, Zhongjing (author) / Zou, Suli (author)

    Published in:

    Efficient Auction Games ; Chapter : 7 ; 173-202


    Publication date :

    2020-02-14


    Size :

    30 pages




    Type of media :

    Article/Chapter (Book)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English