Abstract The paper constructs the game model of the main stakeholders of urban traffic congestion charging by using the related theories and methods about relevant stakeholders and game theory. Through the equilibrium analysis of the game model, several possible pure strategy Nash equilibrium results and their realization conditions are obtained. An analysis of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium shows that the government can use part of the cost of traffic congestion to subsidize the traveler through direct or indirect methods, thus inducing the traveler to choose public transport. The government makes a reasonable traffic congestion rate and the fees are used for public transport subsidies and urban road construction. It can induce travelers to choose public transport. Especially in the early period of traffic congestion charging, providing certain compensation for the public transports will be conducive to development and sustainable development.


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    Title :

    Game Analysis on Urban Traffic Congestion Charging


    Contributors:
    Wang, Haifeng (author) / Li, Xiaoli (author) / Yu, Lijing (author) / Jiang, Yongqiang (author)


    Publication date :

    2019-09-17


    Size :

    9 pages





    Type of media :

    Article/Chapter (Book)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




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