Abstract The Vehicle Quota System manages vehicle ownership in Singapore by making the procurement of a Certificate of Entitlement (COE) a prerequisite for the registration of a new vehicle. The procurement is done during uniform price auctions of quotas of COEs currently held on a twice-a-month schedule. The auction format which started out as sealed bids in May 1990 changed to open bids in July 2001. This paper uses a regression model framework to investigate if this shift in auction format has resulted in lower COE premium volatility and a better reflection of demand and supply forces. The empirical results are pertinent to transport policy analysis. A suggestion in the form of incentives for early bids is also made to improve the efficiency of the open bids auction.


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    Title :

    Sealed v/s open bids for certificates of entitlement under the vehicle quota system in Singapore


    Contributors:

    Published in:

    Publication date :

    2010




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



    Classification :

    BKL:    74.75$jVerkehrsplanung$jVerkehrspolitik / 55.80$jVerkehrswesen$jTransportwesen: Allgemeines / 55.80 Verkehrswesen, Transportwesen: Allgemeines / 74.75 Verkehrsplanung, Verkehrspolitik