This paper investigates joint road charging schemes in a public-private partnership (PPP) network by simultaneously taking into account Cournot-Nash (CN) players and user equilibrium (UE) players. Each joint scheme comprises a tradable credit plan for public roads and a regular tolling plan for private roads. We show that, under UE-CN mixed equilibrium, there exist anonymous nonnegative joint schemes that can support a system optimum link flow pattern. By using preemptive approach, we further design three bi-objective optimization models with hybrid implementation of tradable credit and road pricing. Numerical examples demonstrate that the proposed methods are effective in managing PPP networks.
Joint implementation of tradable credit and road pricing in public-private partnership networks considering mixed equilibrium behaviors
2016
Article (Journal)
English
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