Strategic trade policy has become an important tool used by countries to increase domestic welfare. Ma and Ulph (2012) further this discussion by analyzing strategic advertising policy in international oligopoly markets. They find that it is always optimal for a home government to subsidize advertising for exports, whether firms compete in a Cournot- or Bertrand-type game. By extending their analysis to include the Cournot-Bertrand model, we find that an advertising subsidy is not always optimal for the home country. In some cases, the optimal strategic policy is an advertising tax.


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    Title :

    Strategic advertising policy in international oligopoly markets



    Published in:

    Publication date :

    2016




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Print


    Language :

    English



    Classification :

    BKL:    83.72 Verkehrswirtschaft / 83.71 Handel
    Local classification FBW:    oek 3855



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