Safety assessment of new air traffic management systems is a main issue for civil aviation authorities. Standard techniques such as testing and simulation have serious limitations in new systems that are significantly more autonomous than the older ones. In this paper, we present an innovative approach, based on formal verification, for establishing the correctness of conflict detection systems. Fundamental to our approach is the concept of trajectory, which is a continuous path in the x-y plane constrained by physical laws and operational requirements. From the Model of trajectories, we extract, and formally prove, high level properties that can serve as a framework to analyze conflict scenarios. We use the Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS) alerting algorithm as a case study of our approach.
On the Formal Verification of Conflict Detection Algorithms
2001-05-01
Report
No indication
English
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