The Department of the Navy's strategic vision, Sea Power 21, fails to address adequately America's future power projection and forcible entry requirements; thus, it will not effectively counter the People's Liberation Army in a 2020 maritime conflict across the Taiwan Straits. At present, America's maritime and forcible entry capabilities are based on legacy systems and ambiguous judgments with respect to the future. Future force requirements, however, will never be realistically achieved unless there is a reasonable sense of the nation's future military adversaries. To focus the nation's maritime requirements, a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan is considered. Concluding that China is seriously considering the employment of military force against Taiwan, and that America's counter-action will be the employment of military force, this paper initially focuses on anticipating the People's Republic of China's (PRC) future capabilities to successfully seize Taiwan. With the PRC's military capabilities forecasted, the paper then presents a viable 2020 war scenario: China's use of force to seize Taiwan and America's military response to prevent it. From this analysis, the paper identifies and comments on America's future maritime power projection and forcible entry requirements. (30 refs.).
Developing Sea Power 21 for America's Next Maritime Conflict
2003
31 pages
Report
No indication
English
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Warfare , United states , Military capabilities , Naval operations , China , Taiwan , Military forces(Foreign) , Navy , Vulnerability , Response , Joint military activities , Conflict , Power , Naval planning , Perception(Psychology) , Sea power 21 , Peoples liberation army , Future war , Forcible entry , Power projection , Anti access , Taiwan straits , Maritime capabilities , Maritime conflict , Sino american conflict , Military perceptions , Operational intentions
Engineering Index Backfile | 1940
|Engineering Index Backfile | 1940
|NTIS | 1998
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