An analysis of the joint communications doctrine at the operational level war is conducted in order to determine if the doctrine contributes to successful prosecution of the operational art. Communications failures during Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 liberation of the island of Grenada, helped precipitate the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Joint doctrine has been steadily developed since then, with a primary focus on the operational level of war. Joint communications doctrine has been developed faster than joint doctrine in general, but it suffers from deficiencies. Communications support during Operation Desert Storm, and during Operation Provide Comfort, the Kurdish humanitarian relief mission, provide examples of problems in the existing joint communications doctrine. The current doctrine tends to aggregate the existing Service doctrine, and focuses on managing interoperability. In order to improve substantially, the joint communications doctrine must focus on the goal of facilitating the integration and synchronization of all elements of the joint operational force. The doctrine must set the baseline for the Services.


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    Title :

    Joint Communications Doctrine at the Operational Level


    Contributors:
    C. M. Tegen (author)

    Publication date :

    1993


    Size :

    30 pages


    Type of media :

    Report


    Type of material :

    No indication


    Language :

    English