During the Cold War, military deterrence evolved into a mutually supportive, strategic nuclear and conventional approach. Conventional deterrence, though, was subordinate to nuclear deterrence. Operationally this framework of deterrence extended to U.S. allies and friends, and functioned with a focus on escalation and punishment. Beginning in the early 1990's as the Cold War environment dissipated, the requirement to reassess U.S. deterrence strategy became evident. Based on the changing security environment, conventional deterrence could no longer remain subordinate to or implicitly attached to nuclear deterrence. The purpose of this paper is to explore what factors gave rise in the years since the Cold War to a concept of conventional deterrence equal in standing to nuclear deterrence. These factors are also applied to current and potential trends to examine the future of conventional deterrence in U.S. strategy. Theoretical concepts of deterrence will serve as a foundation for discussion and analysis of the factors that have undergone fundamental changes since the Cold War. Overall, dynamics of the conventional and nuclear components of deterrence strategy must be balanced properly in response to the strategic environment in order to capitalize on the effectiveness of deterrence strategy.
Conventional Military Deterrence - Its Rise to Dominance and Its Future
2002
40 pages
Report
No indication
English
Conventional Forces and the Future of Deterrence
NTIS | 1992
|Conventional Deterrence After Arms Control
NTIS | 1989
|Challenge for NATO: Improving Conventional Deterrence
NTIS | 1988
|Deterrence failures and deterrence strategies
TIBKAT | 1977
|