The major conclusion for civil defense planning is that small or intrawar attacks, arising out of deep crises, are the easiest and cheapest to prepare against, apparently the least unlikely, and yet among the most neglected of civil defense contingencies. While the possibility of massive surprise attack should not be ignored, the relative overemphasis upon it has hampered realistic planning efforts. A more realistic allocation of planning emphases leads to increased interest in civil defense and emergency planning programs containing some or all of the following elements: (1) a crisis mobilization base; (2) a tension mobilization base; (3) a post-attack recuperation base; (4) possible arms control and increased defense agreements, including cooperative civil defense; and (5) programs that vary protection with population density to reduce the lucrativeness of population targets. Strategic and political aspects of such program elements are discussed, and, on balance, they are recommended. (Author)


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    Title :

    Changing Prospects, Missions and Roles for Civil Defense: 1965-1975


    Contributors:
    W. M. Brown (author) / R. D. Castil (author) / H. Kahn (author) / A. J. Wiener (author)

    Publication date :

    1965


    Size :

    2 pages


    Type of media :

    Report


    Type of material :

    No indication


    Language :

    English




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