In the wake of the Cold War, the United States is reexamining the roles and missions of the armed services. Doctrine published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) establishes different missions by the responsibilities and procedures necessary to conduct joint operations. Unfortunately, current U. S. doctrine for countering air and missile threats is disjointed because the armed services: do not share the same vision on how theater air defense should he conducted, do not trust how the doctrine will be implemented, and do not have impartial representation on the Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) staff. Charges of parochialism have plagued joint doctrine since its inception. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1996, CJCS selected services to act as 'lead agents' in developing the various joint publications. CJCS should abolish the 'lead agent' concept establish a joint command to forge a central vision for multiservice operations. The unified commander-in-chiefs can assist in promoting trust in joint counterair operations by establishing a theater JFACC staff. This joint staff will ensure impartial service representation, end ease inter-theater cooperation and training. With the decline of the military budget, joint defense offers the best solution for providing the U.S. with the decisive combat power it needs to defeat future air and missile threats.
Disjointed: U.S. Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats
1996
17 pages
Report
No indication
English
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