An overview of more than 45 years of NASA human spaceflight experience is presented with respect to the thrust axis vibration response of liquid fueled rockets known as pogo. A coupled structure and propulsion system instability, pogo can result in the impairment of the astronaut crew, an unplanned engine shutdown, loss of mission, or structural failure. The NASA history begins with the Gemini Program and adaptation of the USAF Titan II ballistic missile as a spacecraft launch vehicle. It continues with the pogo experienced on several Apollo-Saturn flights in both the first and second stages of flight. The defining moment for NASA s subsequent treatment of pogo occurred with the near failure of the second stage on the ascent of the Apollo 13 mission. Since that time NASA has had a strict 'no pogo' philosophy that was applied to the development of the Space Shuttle. The 'no pogo' philosophy lead to the first vehicle designed to be pogo-free from the beginning and the first development of an engine with an integral pogo suppression system. Now, more than 30 years later, NASA is developing two new launch vehicles, the Ares I crew launch vehicle propelling the Orion crew excursion vehicle, and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle. A new generation of engineers must again exercise NASA s system engineering method for pogo mitigation during design, development and verification.
NASA Experience with Pogo in Human Spaceflight Vehicles
2008
23 pages
Report
No indication
English
NASA Experience with Pogo in Human Spaceflight Vehicles
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