Since 2000, the Navy has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs. For example, it reduced the workforce requirements for some of its ships and transitioned away from instructor-led training programs to more computer-based training. In June 2010, we reported the Navy lacked a firm analytical basis for some of the reductions it made to ship crew sizes and therefore could not be assured it had appropriately sized its crews to maintain material readiness and accomplish necessary tasks aboard its ships. We also reported the Navy lacked outcome- based performance measures to evaluate the impact of changes to training on trainees job performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities once they report to their ships and therefore could not fully determine the effectiveness of the training changes it implemented and whether further adjustments were necessary. We recommended the Navy validate the underlying assumptions and standards it uses to calculate workforce requirements and, as necessary, based on this assessment, reevaluate its cruiser and destroyer workload requirements. We also recommended the Navy develop additional metrics to measure the effectiveness of its training. The Navy concurred with our recommendations.
Military Readiness: Navy's Report to Congress on the Impact of Training and Crew Size on Surface Force Material Readiness
2011
12 pages
Report
No indication
English
Military Sciences , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Job Training & Career Development , Personnel Management, Labor Relations & Manpower , Combat readiness , Operational readiness , Military training , Congress , Ships , Jobs , Sizes(Dimensions) , Performance(Human) , Costs , Surfaces , Manpower , Crews , Instructors , Personnel , Work , Trainees , Workload , Computer aided instruction , Destroyers , Requirements , Cruisers , Military forces(United states) , Military operations , Gao reports