The pervasiveness of GPS in the construct of Joint Vision 2010 creates a critical vulnerability in the operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and focused logistics, while the proliferation of GPS technology in general creates exceptional challenges for the operational commander in the area of full dimensional protection. This paper addresses the vulnerabilities created by GPS proliferation in the operational concepts of JV 2010. To emphasize this point, the first three concepts are examined in the context of a conflict where the GPS signal is not available in the operational commander's battlespace. GPS proliferation is then viewed from the perspective of the enemy in the operational concept of full dimensional protection. That is, the 'switch is turned back on' and the enemy can also use GPS. Finally, recommendations are made to reduce the critical vulnerabilities pointed out in the first three JV 2010 concepts, and the threats posed by a GPS-equipped enemy in the concept of full dimensional protection. GPS is truly a double-edged sword. The United States must not rely too heavily on this one technology in its vision for future forces. Should GPS capabilities be denied, the options available to the operational commander of 2010 could be grievously reduced. Concurrently, the capabilities of a GPS-equipped foe must he planned for. The future commander will face an enemy with targeting capabilities similar to his own. We must plan now for a military future with GPS. We must be keenly aware, however, of this technology's ability to cut both ways as a 'double-edged sword'.


    Access

    Access via TIB

    Check availability in my library


    Export, share and cite




    Outsourcing:The double-edged sword

    McElroy,J. | Automotive engineering | 1988


    Cabin Avionics: A Double-Edged Sword

    Nash, T. | British Library Online Contents | 1996