This study establishes lessons, and draws conclusions from Israeli Air Force air-to-surface operations during the battle for Golan in October, 1973. The Israeli air mission and principal operational factors are identified and described. A historical analysis then considers how the principal factors influenced Israeli fighter operations, and determines what results were achieved. The study shows that Israeli air-to-surface operations during the battle were equivalent to current US Air Force doctrine for Battlefield Air Interdiction. Enemy ground forces and their objectives, Israeli assets, threats to fighter operations, and environmental conditions are described and analyzed to establish how they influenced operations. The results of operations are then measured against the doctrinal goals of Battlefield Air Interdiction to determine Israeli success. Keywords: AirLand battle, Battlefield Air Interdiction, Offensive air support, Yom Kippur War, Middle East War, Israeli Air Force. (jes)
Lessons from Israeli Battlefield Air Interdiction During the Battle for Golan, October 1973
1988
93 pages
Report
No indication
English
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Air strikes , Air to surface , Airborne , Air Force , Battlefields , Enemy , Fighter aircraft , History , Infantry , Interdiction , Israel , Middle East , Military doctrine , Military forces(Foreign) , Missions , Tactical air support , Threats , Warfare , Golan Heights , Strategy
Israeli Battle Shock Casualties: 1973 and 1982
NTIS | 1983
|Drug Interdiction Effectiveness
NTIS | 1991
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