This paper demonstrates that the Army must embrace jointness to affect future employment of its attack helicopters as an element of airpower. To accommodate the joint employment of these aircraft, Army doctrine must evolve beyond dated, Cold War doctrine that restricts helicopters to exclusive support of the land component. Analysis of the air campaign in Kosovo serves to illustrate a missed opportunity to start the doctrinal evolution. In this conflict, the Army arrived in theater unprepared to conduct its assigned airpower mission. By the time they were ready to fight, the nature of the conflict changed sufficiently to render attack helicopters unnecessary. A solution, to remedy future scenarios, is to assign joint operational missions to the Army's corps aviation brigades and attack helicopter regiments, similar to maritime interdiction missions flown by 6th Cavalry Brigade in Korea. In addition to joint doctrinal evolution, if the Army is to achieve relevancy as an element of airpower, it must make changes to its attack helicopter force structure. A shift in training focus and willingness within the Army to subordinate attack helicopters to other components of the joint force, particularly the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), will assure their airpower role.
Army Aviation as an Element of Airpower
2000
31 pages
Report
No indication
English