For years, there has been one constant challenge for the United States and coalition military operations in Afghanistan: insufficient rotary wing aircraft. The question must be asked, is the military lacking sufficient rotary wing assets, or is the lack of jointness preventing the efficient use of its assets across all branches of the service. This paper proposes that the problem lies in a lack of jointness due to divergent tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), not a lack of assets. Each branch of the service operates under its own Weapons schools that create service specific doctrine and TTPs. Creating and Joint Weapons School and Doctrine that overarches the service weapons schools will ensure a unity of effort by aligning TTPs and Doctrine at the Operational level. By reviewing several ad hoc helicopter missions, this paper will demonstrate that divergent TTPs and parochial protection mechanisms prevent joint capabilities. The creation of a Joint Weapons School will force emulation of the Joint Fixed Wing Tactical Air capabilities and JFACC created through pre-deployment joint training, and exercises.


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    Title :

    Why Aren't Helicopters Operating Jointly: A Case for a Joint Helicopter Doctrine


    Contributors:

    Publication date :

    2010


    Size :

    22 pages


    Type of media :

    Report


    Type of material :

    No indication


    Language :

    English