The loss of a modern aircraft entails the probable loss of highly trained and experienced crews that took years to develop. Furthermore, if a target is missed because of defensive reactions to radar-guided weapons, the sortie is lost and the target will have to be attacked again, draining valuable resources from the war effort and risking the attack package all over again. Therefore, the jamming of early warning, ground-control intercept, and acquisition radars maximizes the success of strike packages by creating significant confusion and friction inside the command and control system of an adversary by denying critical intelligence on aircraft routes, altitudes, and timing. This friction slows an adversary's ability to respond to aerial attacks and therefore contributes directly to the preservation of experienced combat crews and aircraft. Joint Publication 3-01.4 defines Electronic Warfare (EW) as 'any military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.' EW is further divided into three subcategories: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protect (EP), and Electronic Warfare Support (ES). The Air Force's decision to retire the EF-111A and join the Navy in the creation of four EA-6B Joint Expeditionary Squadrons highlights a significant shift in the EA philosophy of the Department of Defense and forms the basis for this monograph.


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