This monograph examines the question can the military intelligence battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence) (MI BN (CEWI)) maneuver on the modern battlefield and function as a viable combat multiplier. The evolution of the US Army doctrine from active defense to AirLand Battle paralleled the birth of CEWI. CEWI organization, equipment, and doctrine reacted to the army doctrine by slowly adjusting from a baseline defense mentality to the realities of maneuver warfare. The monograph examines the classical theoretical origins of maneuver and the doctrinal evolution from active defense to AirLand Battle. Next the evolution of military intelligence maneuver doctrine is examined. Artillery maneuver doctrine is examined as a foil for how another branch incorporates maneuver. Having explored the theoretical and doctrinal origins of military intelligence maneuver doctrine, the doctrine is compared against the Desert Storm tactics, techniques, and procedures of heavy division MI BNs (CEWI) to evaluate actual operations against the doctrinal standard. The monograph concludes a thorough understanding of AirLand Battle doctrine, with assistance from intelligence doctrine, guided maneuver training in Desert Storm. Aggressive maneuver training assured MI BNs (CEWI) effective maneuver. Absent an electronic opponent, successful maneuver proved MI BNs (CEWI) a viable combat multiplier. Finally, successful maneuver is pivotal to future intelligence and electronic warfare operations.
Electronic Pivot of Maneuver: The Military Intelligence Battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence) (MI BN (CEWI))
1993
62 pages
Report
No indication
English