The failed Anglo-Franco naval assault on Turkish fortifications at the Dardanelles on 18 March 1915 poses one of the greatest 'What ifs' in the history of warfare. Success could have knocked Turkey out of World War I and opened lines of communication to Russia. This paper examines the historical and strategic background behind the Dardanelles operation. It also examines the British command structure and the process by which the Dardanelles was selected as an alternate target to the Western Front. Finally, the paper analyzes the various facets of operational design and how the failure of operational art prevented the British from clearly articulating their strategic objectives and from translating those objectives into operational and tactical success.
Results Would Justify Severe Loss: The Dardanelles Naval Assault of 1915 & Operational Art
2010
37 pages
Report
No indication
English
Education, Law, & Humanities , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Military history , First world war , Naval operations , International relations , Turkey , Aegean sea , United kingdom , France , Military strategy , Warfare , Mediterranean sea , Dardanelles , Vice admiral carden , Asquith war council , Gallipoli , Derobeck , Marmara sea , Vice admiral sir john duckworth , Fourth coalition , Constantinople , Ottoman empire , Operational art , Royal navy , Winston Churchill , Kitchener
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