This thesis proposes to modify the source of funding for overseas maneuver damage claims from the U.S. Army Claims Service (USARCS) to the unit responsible for causing the damage. Law and Economic theory supports this proposed change. The thesis discusses Law and Economic Theory, the Coase Theorem, the underlying statutory mechanisms for paying overseas maneuver damage claims, and historic trends and Army doctrine related to maneuvers. Then Law and Economic Theory are applied to overseas maneuver damage claims mechanisms. The author concludes that if overseas maneuver damage claims were paid with funds directly from the Operations and Maintenance budget of the maneuvering unit, rather than from USARCS funds, commanders would have to take those costs into consideration, resulting in a more efficient outcome.
Economic Efficiency of the Army's Maneuver Damage Claims Program: Coarse, But No Cigar
2006
88 pages
Report
No indication
English
Business & Economics , Social Concerns , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Military exercises , Overseas , Federal law , Army operations , Compensation , Maneuvers , Damage , Economic analysis , Operational readiness , Nato , Efficiency , Theses , Payment , Wounds and injuries , Death , Civilian personnel , Agreements , Army training , Army personnel , Government(Foreign) , Army budgets , United states government , Regulations , Military history , Theory , Foreign law , Overseas maneuver damage , Damage claims , Coase theorem , Usarcs(Us army claims service) , Foreign claims act , Military claims act , International agreements claims act , Social benefits , Social costs , Coase ronald , Calabrisi guido , Melamed douglas , Damage costs , Legal economics , Welfare economics , Pigou arthur c , Public good , Negative externalities , Nato sofa(Nato status of forces agreement)