As exemplified by the Falkland's war, a stationary battle group is especially vulnerable to attack by small, low flying missiles. Shipboard sensors are unable to provide timely alerting of such an attack to the various defensive elements because the low flying attacking missile is over the horizon and invisible to radars until it pops over the horizon near the ships. Even at the time it is difficult to see because it is lost in background sea clutter. An early alerting technique is needed. The concept is that of a 'fence' of radar buoys, deployed in an arc at 65 km to 130 km from the ship group in a direction identified as a potential threat axis. The buoys would be expendable, operate for 10 hours on station, by deployed by P-3 or S-2 ASW aircraft, and would communicate detection alarms to the ship group by HF radio. The current contract is for analysis to determine the feasibility of the radar buoy concept.
Distributed RF Sensor Systems for Battle Group Defense
1985
63 pages
Report
No indication
English
Radiofrequency Detection , Marine Engineering , Antimissile Defense Systems , Buoys , Warning systems , Fences , Guided missiles , Defense systems , Radar , Attack , Axes , Background , Battle group level organizations , Detectors , Distribution , Falkland islands , Flight , High frequency , Horizon , Radiofrequency , Sea clutter , Shipboard , Ships , Stationary , Threats , Time , Visibility , Vulnerability , Warfare
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