The Air Force has purchased its first new generation of airlift aircraft with the acquisition of the C-17. More than just replacing the C-141 as the workhorse of the Air Force, the C-17 has also replaced part of the crew with inertial navigation systems, computers, and automation. The reliance on the automation of the C-17 demands a smooth interface between crew and automation, the crew must stay informed of the progress of the systems, and remain prepared to assume manual control should the automation fail. To accomplish this, the automation must be designed for ease of use and the crew must be trained to work in harmony with each other and the automation. Each aircraft manufacturer has a particular philosophy about how its aircraft are automated, and each aircraft operator has a philosophy about operating those aircraft. An understanding of these philosophies and the knowledge of problems associated with automation are valuable tools for pilots. This paper will discuss those philosophies, including the philosophies of the design and operation of the C-17. Fortunately, civilian aviation has had over ten years of experience dealing with the many intricacies of these highly automated aircraft. Pilot reports and academic research have identified specific problems, or pitfalls associated with automated aircraft. This paper presents pitfalls to be avoided by Air Force operators.
Automated Cockpit Technologies: Implications for Air Mobility Command Aircrews
1997
59 pages
Report
No indication
English
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