China launched a direct-ascent ASAT weapon on January 11, 2007, which struck a Chinese FY-1 weather satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO). The ASAT's kinetic kill vehicle was likely boosted by a two-stage launcher based on a DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile, which may be mounted on a mobile launcher. China reportedly conducted several previous tests of the system; it is unclear if the same configuration was used for all the tests. The successful test demonstrates a Chinese capability to destroy a number of U.S. satellites in LEO used for reconnaissance, remote sensing, surveillance, electronic surveillance, and meteorology. The direct-ascent ASAT appears to be part of a larger Chinese ASAT program that includes ground-based lasers and jamming of satellite signals. People's Republic of China (PRC) analysts, scientists, and strategists have written extensively about ASAT weapons and potential means of countering U.S. military uses of space. The revelation by the director of the NRO that Chinese lasers have 'painted' U.S. satellites indicates a capability to disrupt imaging satellites by dazzling or blinding them. Jamming can disrupt U.S. military communications and global positioning system (GPS) navigation and targeting signals. The exact performance characteristics of Chinese systems are unknown, but a range of ASAT capabilities would provide flexible options to temporarily or permanently deny U.S. space capabilities. The NDU's Institute for National Strategic Studies convened an unclassified roundtable to discuss the motivations and implications of China's direct-ascent ASAT weapons test. The roundtable was intended to highlight issues and perspectives that U.S. policy makers should consider in thinking about U.S. responses to the test. This report draws heavily on views expressed at the discussion, but the authors have added further analysis to provide a fuller explication of the relevant policy issues.
China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications
2007
8 pages
Report
No indication
English
Behavior & Society , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Surface Launched Missiles , Electromagnetic & Acoustic Countermeasures , Unmanned Spacecraft , Flight testing(Guided missiles) , Antisatellite missiles , Countermeasures , International relations , Motivation , China , Military capabilities , Low orbit trajectories , Demonstrations , Response , Laser weapons , Artificial satellites , Jamming , Arms control , Agreements , Intervention , Space weapons , Taiwan , Deterrence , Intermediate range(Distance) , Earth orbits , Debris , Military forces(Foreign) , Government(Foreign) , United states government , Diplomacy , Reprints , Policies , Weapons testing , Direct ascent antisatellite missiles , Low earth orbit , Debris clouds , Blinding lasers , International criticism , Space debris , Taiwan conflict , Intervention delay , Space weapons race , Satellite protection , Satellite replacements , Satellite jamming , Satellite lasing , Code of conduct , International agreements , United states-china relations , Dissuasion
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