In order to analyze operational level capabilities, a common definition for operational art and level of war has been determined. Current rotary wing organizations and equipment of the Soviet division, army, front and theater and the U.S. division and corps are explained in some detail along with current tactical and operational employment doctrine. Analysis criteria include comparison of command and control doctrine, employment doctrine, relative force size and helicopter design. Among the many conclusions drawn from this analysis are: rapid Soviet progress since 1975 to close the gap between U.S. and Soviet tactical level rotary wing forces; that decentralization of Soviet rotary wing forces to division, army and front commanders has dramatically improved the ability of the Soviet operational commander to effectively employ helicopters in combat; the dramatic increase in the number of Soviet combat helicopters produced since 1975; the clear advantage enjoyed by the Soviets in operational level heavy-lift helicopters; the realization that Soviet rotary wing forces exist only to enhance the tempo of the all-important land battle while U.S. forces are considered maneuver elements and can establish their own combat tempo.
U.S. and Soviet Rotary Wing Aviation at the Operational Level of War
1986
53 pages
Report
No indication
English
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Aircraft , Parachutes & Decelerators , Rotary wing aircraft , Aerial warfare , Command and control systems , Military forces(United states) , Ussr , Land warfare , Maneuvers , Theater level operations , Military doctrine , Tactical warfare , Helicopters , Operational effectiveness , Wing level organizations , AirLand Battle Doctrine
SLUB | 1939
|GENERAL AVIATION - DLR keeps rotary and fixed-wing separate
Online Contents | 2008