Doctrinal development within the United States Navy (USN), for a variety of reasons, has traditionally been a slow, tedious process, oriented to the tactical level, and developed by fleet operating units. In the past ten years however, the emergence of the operational level of war within Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and joint doctrine has left the Navy in the unenviable position of being the sole combatant service lacking a published service doctrine addressing the operational level of war. Identifying the antecedents of this situation, assessing the validity of a requirement for a Navy publication addressing the operational level of war and proposing an outline for such a document are the basis for this paper. An initial examination of the definition of doctrine and the U.S. Navy's resistance to doctrine is undertaken, followed by a brief review of the three levels of war (strategic, operational, tactical) and their interrelationships. An examination of the status of operational doctrine in current USN publications is made, followed by a discussion of the requirement for a USN doctrinal publication addressing the operational level of war. Comparisons of Navy, land-based, and air-based operations follows. Based on the above research, recommendations are made for a target audience and contents, and a proposed outline for a Navy operational doctrine publication is provided. Operational, Level, War, Art, Doctrine, Publication, Navy, Outline, Proposal, Naval.
Operational Doctrine for the United States Navy: A Proposal
1994
34 pages
Report
No indication
English
Engineering Index Backfile | 1935
NTIS | 1994
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