What if an operational leader told you that he had such conflicting demands that he was in a 'no-win' dilemma. He could satisfy either demand but not both -- and to fail to satisfy either would exact great professional and personal cost. General John D. Lavelle faced such a dilemma toward the close of the Vietnam War. When General Lavelle assumed command of Seventh Air Force in Saigon, South Vietnam, on 1 August 1971, he inherited rules of engagement (ROE) that had evolved over three years. The ROE maintained the basic restrictions of a 1968 agreement by the Johnson administration defining the conditions under which U.S. aircraft could attack enemy aircraft or weapons systems. Aircrews could not fire unless they were threatened. Enemy surface-to-air missiles (SAM) or antiaircraft artillery (AAA) had to 'activate against' aircrews before they could respond with a 'protective reaction strike.' Warning gear installed in the planes alerted aircrews that an enemy SAM firing site was tracking them. American aircrews lost this advantage late in 1971, when the North Vietnamese vastly improved their tracking capability by integrating their early warning, surveillance, and AAA radars with the SAM sites. This integrated system allowed them to launch their missiles without being detected by the radar warning gear of U.S. aircraft. General Lavelle later testified to Congress that he 'alerted his superiors to the enemy's netting of his radars and advised them that the North Vietnamese now possessed the capability of firing with little or no warning.' The air war had changed. General Lavelle made repeated and futile attempts to get the ROE changed to reflect the new threat to his aircrews and planes. Not only did Washington refuse to change the ROE, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff severely criticized General Lavelle for a lack of aggressiveness in fighting the air war. The general had a problem. What took priority: the ROE or the safety and effectiveness of his command.
Leadership between a Rock and a Hard Place
1996
9 pages
Report
No indication
English
Education, Law, & Humanities , Job Training & Career Development , Personnel Management, Labor Relations & Manpower , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Military history , Vietnam war , North vietnam , Military commanders , Aerial warfare , Decision making , Rules of engagement , Antiaircraft missiles , Surface to air missiles , Ethics , Early warning systems , Radar tracking , Reprints , Antiaircraft guns , Integrated systems , Air force , Military tactics , Leadership , Lavelle john d , Seventh air force , Personal integrity , Protective reaction strikes , Radar integration , Antiaircraft artillery , Gci(Ground controlled intercept radar) , Radar networks , Professional dilemmas , Personal dilemmas , Professional integrity , False reporting , Forced retirement , Command ethics
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