This paper addresses how the operational commander used Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. The air phase of Operation Allied Force marked the largest employment of UAVs in military history. The writer argues that UAV doctrine and contingency operations must evolve in order for the operational commander to fully integrate UAVs into the joint force, and UAV intelligence and targeting, combined with reduced risk to U.S. pilots, significantly enhance the warfighting capability of the operational commander. This paper will first analyze the history of UAVs, then discuss their types and capabilities. Next, it will examine UAV employment in Kosovo, and analyze their effectiveness using operational factors as a tool. Finally, the paper will examine their losses, discuss potential roles in peace operations, and deduce lessons learned. Future operations will benefit from improved joint force integration and interoperability of UAVs.
UAV Employment in Kosovo: Lessons for the Operational Commander
2000
36 pages
Report
No indication
English
Aircraft , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Combat effectiveness , Aerial warfare , Drones , Military tactics , Military history , Time dependence , Military doctrine , Combat readiness , Interoperability , Pilots , Targeting , Nato forces , Kosovo , Allied force operation , Unmanned aerial vehicles
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