The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAB) determined that organizational and management issues were significant contributors to the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia. In addition, the CAIB observed similarities between the organizational and management climate that preceded the Challenger accident and the climate that preceded the Columbia accident. To prevent recurrence of adverse organizational and management climates, effective implementation of the system safety function is suggested. Attributes of an effective system safety program are presented. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) system safety program is analyzed using the attributes. Conclusions and recommendations for improving the MSFC system safety program are offered in this case study.
Improving Performance of the System Safety Function at Marshall Space Flight Center
2004
14 pages
Report
No indication
English
Space Technology , Administration & Management , Aerospace safety , Performance evaluation , Improvements , Columbia(Orbiter) , Accident investigations , Space shuttle missions , Implementation , Safety programs , Attributes , Recommendations , Case studies , Columbia Accident Investigation Board(CAIB)
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