To maximize effectiveness, theater missile defense (TMD) should include counterforce options, active defenses and passive defenses. During the Gulf War, however, the integration of these three elements occurred on an ad hoc basis. To increase the political, strategic and tactical effectiveness of existing defensive systems in wartime, Army planners should integrate the three elements of TMD into an overall strategy. This report describes how the philosophy that influenced antisubmarine warfare operations can be used to guide counterforce attacks against mobile missiles, thereby improving theater missile defenses. It explains why an ASW approach to counterforce is superior to just attacking an opponent's missile infrastructure. It also explains why this type of counterforce strategy can be based on preemption not preventive war. The impact of ASW counterforce operations are also evaluated in terms of the stability/instability paradox, crisis stability, alliance relations and deterrence.
Counterforce and Theater Missile Defense: Can the Army Use an ASW Approach to the SCUD Hunt
1995
21 pages
Report
No indication
English
Antimissile Defense Systems , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Surface to air missiles , Antimissile defense systems , Theater missile defense , Stability , Warfare , Theater level operations , Active defense , Passive systems , Mobile , Army , Instability , Antisubmarine warfare , Infrastructure , Counterforces(Military)
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