For the last thirty years U.S. space control strategy has focused on the Soviet space threat and sought to achieve absolute control of the space environment through the destruction of their satellites. Today an increasing number of nations operate their own space systems or purchase space capabilities that could be used for military purposes. In light of this proliferating threat from space, there may be situations where attaining control of space through the destruction of satellites is not politically feasible. This thesis assesses the effectiveness of current U.S. space control strategy in an environment characterized by the increasing proliferation of space systems. An alternative space control strategy is offered that focuses on attaining information dominance through the denial of information provided by space systems.
Extract from: Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance
1993
48 pages
Report
No indication
English
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