This paper reviews the NATO mission of deterrence and the threat of its use of nuclear weapons. It suggests that the threat is viable until a war starts, but then becomes meaningless because the FRG would opt for a different course of action--its 'Unexpected Response.' The conclusion is that convential forces are the essential deterrent given strategic parity. Then strategic mobility is addressed as it provides greater conventional reinforcement potential than generally assumed. An 'Unexpected Response' by the Congress which could be counter-productive to the use of our new mobility is then discussed.


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    Title :

    Unexpected Response


    Contributors:
    T. R. White (author)

    Publication date :

    1985


    Size :

    26 pages


    Type of media :

    Report


    Type of material :

    No indication


    Language :

    English




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