Profit-sharing is needed within platoons in order for competing transportation companies to collaborate in forming platoons. In this paper, we propose distribution models of the profit designed for vehicles that are located at the same origin and are operated by competing transportation companies. The vehicles have default departure times, but can decide to depart at other times in order to benefit from platooning. We model the strategic interaction among vehicles with game theory and consider pure Nash equilibria as the solution concept. In a numerical evaluation we compare the outcomes of the games associated with different distribution models of the profit.


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    Title :

    Game Theoretic Models for Profit-Sharing in Multi-fleet Platoons


    Contributors:


    Publication date :

    2019-10-01


    Size :

    347613 byte




    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



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