We propose a new model for fair division and vehicle routing, where drivers have monotone profit preferences, and their vehicles have feasibility constraints, for customer requests. For this model, we design two new axiomatic notions for fairness for drivers: FEQ1 and FEF1. FEQ1 encodes driver pairwise bounded equitability. FEF1 encodes driver pairwise bounded envy freeness. We compare FEQ1 and FEF1 with popular fair division notions such as EQ1 and EF1. We also give algorithms for guaranteeing FEQ1 and FEF1, respectively.


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    Title :

    Fair Division meets Vehicle Routing: Fairness for Drivers with Monotone Profits


    Contributors:


    Publication date :

    2022-06-05


    Size :

    471071 byte




    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



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