The sharp increase in e-commerce over the last few years has led to an increase in the volume of trucks both in ports and in commercial areas. Truck traffic has a negative impact on traffic flow in general due to the size of trucks and their slower dynamics. The continuously increasing use of navigation apps has led drivers to make their routing decisions in an independent manner in an effort to minimize their own individual travel time, with possible significant deviation from a socially optimum solution. In this paper, we consider the use of coordinated routing in order to achieve load balancing. Users send their OD matrices as well as their preferred departure time to the coordinator who gives them routing instructions based on a socially optimum cost. This design enables us to derive sufficient conditions under which we prove the existence of mechanisms which are truthful in equilibrium, budget balanced on average and create individual incentives for voluntary participation of the truck drivers. Subsequently, we design our mechanism in a way that only uses a minimal set of sufficient conditions in order to guarantee the existence of a solution and maximize its efficiency. Finally, the extensive simulation results of our approach in the Braess and the Sioux Falls networks demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can approach the system optimum solution.
Coordinated Freight Routing With Individual Incentives for Participation
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems ; 20 , 9 ; 3397-3408
2019-09-01
2077948 byte
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
English
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